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THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN NEW MEXICO
1858-1880, III
By FRANK D. REEVE
CHAPTER

VI

THE WIMINUCHE AND CAPOTE

of 1863 with the Tabaguache pointed the
T
way for the ultimate disposal of the other southern Ute
bands. The next five years were marked by frequent changes
HE TREATY

in the office of special-agent, now located at Tierra Amarilla,
and insufficient funds to provide adequate food and clothing·
for the Wiminuche and Capote, who were becoming more
and more dependent on the government with the decrease
inthe game supply. Superintendent Steck and later Agent
Arny recommended that the special-agency be abolished as
an unnecessary expense, but it was retained despite the fact
that the superintendency as a whole was inadequately
supported.
The matter of furnishing the Indians with food and
clothing was a particularly difficult task. When no annuities
were issued for two years, 1864 and 1865, they became more
restless than usual and indulged in some petty thieving.
Special Agent Graves partially relieved the situation with
his funds and held a councilwith the Ute chiefs in January,
1866, when they promised to punish certain tribesmen
guilty of. a recent depredation. The foBowing year the
superintendent extended the credit of the government and
distributed some food and ammunition at· Tierra Amarilla.
The gift of ammunition was accompanied with a request
that they go off on a hunt, and he promised to supply them
with goods in the fall, a promise that was carried out.
The petty depredations due to hunger were usually
construed as indicating the possibility of war if the situation
was not remedied,1 and the intrusion of the miners into the
1.

Norton to Cooley, 8/5/66. N77/66.

R. B. Mitchell to Cooley, 7/17/66, M61/66.

146

THE FEDERAL INDIAN, POLIOY

147

San ,Juan country heightened that fear. As a precaution
against an outbreak, General Nathaniel Pope established
Fort Lowell at Tierra Amarilla late in 1866. But the chronic
cry that the Ute "must be jed,"2 which was the crux of the
situation, never produced a satisfactory or tangible result
from the commissioner at Washington, although he meant
well:
For the want of sufficient' means, this office
has not always had the power to carry into effect
its purposes and plans for the benefit of Indians
not provided for by treaty stipulations; espeCially
has it been so with regard to' those in Arizona,
New Mexico, and Utah. 3
'His complaint went unheed,ed, for despite the fact that
"Humanity and economy both demand that every effort
should be made to protect the neighboring settlements from
the depredations that would inevitably result from leaving
these Indians with no other alternative for their support
..." the usual appropriation of $50,000 for the support of
the superintendency of New Mexico was reduced from
$50,000 to .$40,000 for the year 1868.4
In the midst "of their (lqualid p'overty" the Ute retained
a surprising degree of self-control. While "The head chief
'So-ba-tah' and his family presented a picture of mostabject poverty, pitiful to. behold," there was a flock of 3,000
sheep within eight miles of their camp! 5 In view of this
condition, the idea of providing them with a reservation like
their brethren the Tabaguache gained ground. Superintendent Norton, following the advice of Dodd arid Carson, recommended that they be located on the San Juan river or its
branch, the Rio de las Animas, in southwestern Colorado. 6
A similar. movement for locating the northern Ute bands
on' a reservation was developing in Colorado. Governor A.
C. ,Hunt was requested by Commissioner Taylor in Novem2.
3.
4.
6.
6.

Norton to Taylor. 8/20/67, N126/67.
A 11 11ual Report, 1867, p, 6.
Mix to Otto, 9/26/68. RB 17, P. 460. '
Hunt to Taylor, 10/2/68, Colo. C1066/68.
Norton to Cooley, 7/29/66, N68/66.
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ber, 1867, to bring two chiefs to Washington from each of
the Tabaguache, Uintah, Grand River, and Yampas bands
of Ute. 7 This move resulted in a treaty that had strong
repercussions in the superintendency of New Mexico and
led ultimately to the location of the southern Ute on the
Colorado reservation.
Governor Hunt and Carson acted promptly and took a
party to Washington, including representatives of the
southern Ute. The Indians were first shown the sights in
order "that the magnitude of the American Capitol may be
more fully understood by them, and related by them to their
various bands upon their return to the mountains."8 Then,
in due time, the treaty was negotiated and signed on March
2, 1868, in their hotel room with the proceedings probably
expedited by a round of "fire-water."9 The provisions as
finally approved by the senate were as follows: the treaty
signed with the Tabaguache in 1863 was made applicable to
all the Ute; a reservation was provided in southwestern
Colorado bounded by a line running north from the territorial boundary along the 107th parallel of longitude to
fifteen miles north of the 40th parallel of latitude, thence
west to the Utah-Colorado boundary; two agencies were
provided, one for the Tabaguache, Moache, Wiminuche, and
Capote to be located on the Rio de los Pinos; $11,500 was
provided for buildings and $8;000 for a saw mill; agents
were to reside at the agencies;' the Indians promised to
deliver up wrong-doers for punishment; upon request, each
head of a family should receive a farm of 160 acres and $250
for four years; a single man should receive an eighty acre
farm; the Ute "pledge themselves to induce" children from
seven to eighteen yea,rs of age to attend school; annuity
goods were promised for thirty years to a maximum of
$30,000 per annum; a similar amount annually for subsistence until self-supporting; $45,000 for "one gentle Ameri7.
8.
9.
An

Taylor to Hunt, 11/12/67, LB 84, p. 556.
Hunt to Mix, 2/4/68, Colo. C575/68.
Hanson to Clinton, 12/9/69, C761/69.
expense of $9,286.77 was incurred in securing the treaty.

U. S. S. L., XV, 315.
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can cow" and five sheep per family; the government was
granted a right of way for railroads and highway; teachers
and instruCtion in mechanics were promised; land sessions
could be made only by vote of three-fourths of the adults;
and land in severalty could be ceded only by the consent of
the individual.1°
This treaty differed from the earlier one in a few details. A different location for the reservation was provided,
more attention was paid to promoting agriculture, two
agencies were provided, education was thought of, and the
grant of annuities was more generous. Governor Hunt
immediately pressed the Washington authorities to make
availabie the $45,000 for sheep and cattle so that the Indians
could be induced to move to the reservation as rapidly as
possible. Now, however, a technical issue arose over interpretation of the treaty. Under the terms of the first agreement of 1863, the government obligations were to be observed when the Ute had settled on the reservation. This
the Indians had never done; consequently, despite the fact
that congress had appropriated the necessary funds to fulfill the terms of the first treaty, they had never received any
benefits. The Tabaguache, on the other hand, had not retired to the reservation because they had not received the
cattle stipulated in the treaty! 11
A solution to this dilemma was sought by forwarding
to Washington a formal declaration from the Tabaguache
and the Moache signifying their intention to move to the
reservation if the cattle and sheep were p,rovided and their
agent accompanied them, After a bit more difficulty, Secretary Browning assented in May to the expenditure of funds
under the terms of the treaty of 1863; but this applied only
to the Tabaguache because the second treaty had not yet
been ratified by the senate.l 2 When the senate finally took
10. Kappler, II, 990-993.
11. Hunt to Taylor, 2/15/68, Colo. C634/68; 2/19/68, Col~. 1760/68;
3/2/68, Colo. C643/68; and 4/4/68, Colo. C705/6S'. Browning to Taylor, 3/24/68, Colo.
1760/68.
.
12. Hunt to Taylor,' 4/4/68, Colo. C704/68: Browning to Taylor, 4/9/68, Colo.
1793/68. Browning to Mix, 5/20/68, Colo. 1858/68, and 5/26/68, Colo. 1868/68.
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favorable action, July 25, 1868, the treaty was amended by
striking out the following provision:
Also one good bull for every twenty-five cows,
and such further sums annually, in the discretion
of Congress, as may be necessary, noLtoexceed
forty-five thousand dollars per annum, and not for
a longer period than four years, shall be expended
as aforesaid to every lodge or head of a family that
shows a disposition to preserve said stock for
increase."13
'
The task of securing the consent of the Indians to the
amendments was entrusted to Governor Hunt. He met with
the Tabaguacheand some of the Moache leaders in a secret
council September 13 and 14, and met with an embarrassing reception, if he could be embarrassed by charges of
chicanery: "the indians told him plainly in said conference that they made no treaty while at Washington last
winter."14 They also took him severely to task for the past
delinquencies of the government in not fulfilling its treaty
obligations; the government was a cheat, they claimed. And
there was substance to their charge. The governor had told
them a year before that a contract had been made to supply
them with Texas cattle. He now tried to save his face by ex~
plaining that there had been a change in the office of Indian
affairs. It took two days for him to beat down their resistance and secure the necessary signatures to the amendments. 15 He also secured the consent of Capote and Wiminuche representatives to the amendments, but the charge of
13,. U. s. S. L., xv, 623.
14. John' Lawrence to Commissioner of Interior, 10/26/68, Colo. L6/69.
Lawrence had lived for eight years at Saguache, Colorado, and was on friendly
terms with the Ute under Chief Ouray, the leader of the northern Colorado bands.
Hunt, of course, considered bim an evil influence. Hunt to Taylor, 11/11/68, Colo.
C1079/68.
15. Hunt to Taylor, 10/14/68', Colo. CI045/68.
Juan Martine Martinez made a sworn statement to John L. Watts, chief justice
of New Mexico, at Santa Fe, 12/23/68, that the Ute did not consent to a single
agency (the location and number of agencies was to be a point of dispute) and that
his signature as interpreter was forged. 'This is just one' charge to show that the
whole'treaty business was tainted with fraud. G3/68. Kappler, II, 994.
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fraud in connection with th~ treaty was ~ troublesome ob,.
stacIe to its fulfillment for several years.
The majority of. the Capote and'Moache bands refused
to recognize the action of their supposed representatives in
making the treaty. Cornea (or Caw:nish), a renegade Capote
and leader Of 'a small band, had signed the treaty under the
name of Pa-bu-sat. Kanii:whe, a troublesome leader among
the Moache, and Ankatosh had represented that band; and
the first named probably did not understand what he was
signing.16
The New Mexico officials were much perturbed by the
action of the Colorado authorities in negotiating the treaty
of 1865. "We, have this one word to whisper to ColoradoLet our Indians alone . . . New Mexico is their home; here
they will stay in peace." The March treaty "must be
abrogated or trouble will ensue. This is plain taJk, but it is
true talk."17 In keeping with this feeling Superintend.ent
Gallegos ~ssembledthe chiefs of the Capote and Wiminuche
at Santa Fe in December, 1868. A protest wa~ duly drawn
up to the effect that Pa-bu-sat was a thief, not a chief, and
was not authorized to make any treaty with Hunt and Carson; furthermore, they did not want to go on a reservation
in Colorado. This document was endorsed by the territorial
officials, civil and ,military, and other prominent citizens,
and forwarded to Washington with the additional information that an attempt to enforce the treaty ~ould mean war,
an oft-repeated warning in these years. 1S
The opposition of officialdom in New Mexico to a reservation in Colorado can be reasonably supposed to have
been due to the possible loss' of patronage in the appointment
of agents and the loss of profits from trading with the
Indians. The settlers, in most instances, would have approved the removal of their troublesome neighbors; some,
16. Council held with Capote and Wimin~che at Santa Fe,' 12/23/68, GS/68.
N. H. Davis, Report, December 1868. W26/69. Keyes to Clinton, 12/7/69, C752/69.
17. 'The Daily New Mexican. 12/15/68', 12/16/68.
18. See GS/68. Also Gallegos to Taylor, 12/12/68, G1/63.
L. E. Webb resigned as superintendent in October, 1868, and was succeeded by
Jose Manuel Gallegos.
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of course, could benefit from seIling supplies to the agencies.
Governor Hunt ignored this opposition on his swing through
New Mexico to secure the signatures to the amended treaty,
not even deigning to consult with Gallegos. 19 There was
some justification for his action and for his belief that the
New Mexicans were surreptitiously trying to block his
policy, because they were represented in the field principally
by a dubious character in the person of Mr. Arny.
The career of Arny in INew Mexico was marked hy suspicious actions from the time of his pa:rticipation in the
Collins fight to the action of the Navaho in driving him
away from their agency. Upon the loss of his job at Abiquiu
in the summer of 1868, he managed to wangle an appointment as special agent. In this capacity he was an unwelcome person to the regular Indian officials, and no wonder;
he made a frontal attack on the sources of profit by proposing to the government that he take charge of the Ute and
subsist them at a price of $600 per month. This offer was
rejected by Commissioner Parker, likewise his proposal to
transfer Ayers, who had succeeded French at Abiquiu, to
the southern Apache agency.20 Ayers, apparently, would
have been an obstacle to exploiting the Indians for profit. 21
The opposition of Arny to the program of Hunt lay in
a counter plan, one designed to keep the· Capote and Wiminuche dependent on an agency that would be supplied from
a distributing point in New Mexico, namely, Santa Fe. He
held a council with them at Pagosa Springs, August 19,
1868, and secured the terms of a treaty they were willing
19. French to Webb, 10/13/68, W1l16/68.
James C. French succeeded Arny as agent at Abiquiu by appointment in July,
1868'.
Arny to Taylor, 4/13/69, New Mexico File, 1869. Ayers to Gallegos, 3/3/69,
G99/69. Parker to Arny, 6//19/69, LB 90, p. 161.
21. Up to the present time agents are for the most part "A set of political
hucksters who, in most cases, came from the east, where they never had any means
of gaining a knowledge of the Indian characrer, and whose boon companions were
pot-house loafers. I am speaking plainly, for no reform can be accomplished unless
the unvarnished truth is told. Men sent to keep Indians contented, whose only
policy was self, and who evinced a greater skill in stealing than the Indians themselves, but not in such a manly way." Ayers to Parker, 8/16/69, C. 1. A., Annual
Report, 1869, p. 241.

20.
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to sign, which provided for a separate reservation and other
favors similar to those granted to the Tabaguache. Strangely
. enough, they de.clined a trip to Washington and delegated
Arny to represent them and have commissioners sent out to
make the definitive agreement. Arny recommended to his
Washington chief that the reservation be located in the New
Mexico portion of the San Juan country, with the agency at
the mouth of the Rio de las Animas, near the present town
of Farmington. The problem of removal did not appear formidable to him officially and by judicious management, he
thought, the nomads could be placed within definite boundaries in the near future. 22
Meanwhile, Governor Hunt was not so optimistic of
success in removing the Indians and found an unfavorable
reception to the idea on his trip southward from Colorado:
I find in conversation with Agent Arny that
he is no more sanguine of success, in obtaining this
consent (that ·of Tabaguache and Muaches) than
I have been & wonder very much, why he should
encourage a mission so hopeless. I find also in talking with him, that I was not mistaken in my impression concerning his, Maxwell & Agent Dennisson's opposition to the success of our treaty. He
also tells me that Senator Ross and Mr. Chaves
of New Mexico have been at work· against it. I
cannot find words to express my astonishment at
such a procedure. This treaty to the mind of every
fair man, who is at the same time a friend of the
Govmt, to the Indians and humanity, must commend itself as one of the best ever made and there
can be but one reason, the loss of patronage to
New Mexico. So far as I am concerned, I am
quite willing N. M. should have all of the Indians,
if she will only take care of them ..." 23
With opposing forces.in the field, the path of the solution to the Ute problem would certainly not be made
smopther. The commissioner of Indian affairs apparently
22. Arny. Report. 8/31/68, 40 Congo 3 sesS. Hse. Ex. Doc. I, II, 626ff (1366\
Arny to Taylor, 9/12/68, A607/68. Arny to Mix, 10/3/68, A610/68.
23. Hunt to Taylor, 11/14/68, 9010. CI091/68.
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sensed this and instructed Arny in November, 1868, to cooperate with Governor Hunt,. the one to visit the Colorado
Ute, the other to work with their New Mexico brethren.
Cooperation, of course, though ostensibly in the interest of
the Indian, could be turned to the whites' advantage if they
were of one mind. Certainly Arny knew it was better to
work with his rival than against him, when possible. Late
in the summer he had written to Hunt to the effect that he
would be glad to see him before starting to Washington :
"I believe it to be important that we should understand each
other fully so as to get the Utes of both Territori~s properly .disposed of."24 This proposal received an unfavorable
reception from the governor. He adjudged the letter as
further evidence of tampering with the Indians to block
the fulfillment of the treaty 'and forwarded it to Washington as evidence to that effect, asserting at the same time that
the New. Mexicans were informing the Indians that they
would be shut up in the Rocky Mountains with a guard of
soldiers like the Navaho had been at the Bosque Redondo. 25
The efforts of the New Mexico officials to invalidate the
treaty negotiated by the Colorado men failed. Perhaps the
Indians had not been fairly represented; and their chiefs
hoodwinked, but a reservation was the logical solution to
the general problem, and the terms of the treaty looked to
the interest of the Ute bands. Furthermore, although some
of the white men involved in the making of the agreement
were not above suspicion,26 ther.e was no definite evidence of
fraud. The government, therefore, stood on the policy of a
fait accompli:

This office must be governed by the treaty. It
purports to be signed by the, authorized representatives of all the bands, and except the reported
statements of the Indians there' is no evidence to
the contrary. The articles or stock provided to be
24. Arny to Hunt, 9/4/68, Colo. CI045/68.
25. Taylor, to Arny, 11/5/68, LB 88, p. 233. Arny to Hunt, 9/4/68, and Hunt to .
Taylor, 10/14/68, Colo. CI045/68'.
26. Lafayette Head, a witness to the treaty, was subsequently exposed for fraud
and dishonesty as agent at the Conejos. Colo. S475/69.
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given to the Indians can not properly be delivered
at anyplace except at the agencies on the reserve,
and the Indians must go there to receive them. It
would· be neither practicable or proper to deliver
such articles or stock e1.sewhere.'!27 .
With this decision rendered, the question of the, location of the agency arose, and her:e geography presented one
of the obstacles to easy solution. The continental divide
.runs roughly in a southwestward direction from near Salida,
Colorado, to the headwaters' of the Rio Grande; thence
southeastward in the direction of Taos, New Mexico, form. ing a: wedge shape. The ·Rio Grande and its tributaries
drain the eastern slopes, the San Juan river system drains
the southwestern slope. The treaty provided for the location of the agency for the soiIthernUte on the Rio de los
Pinos" a tributary of the San Juan, hundreds of miles,away
from Denver with the backbone of the Rockies and allied
ranges intervening. The character of the country and the
distance would make it impracticable to supply the agency
from the Colorado capital. If the agency was located east
of the San Juan Mountains, which constituted the Taos
extension of 'the above wedge, it would be a laborious trip
for the Indians to cross the divide to .secure· their goods;
furthermore, it would take the Capote and Wiminuche outside of their customary haunts.
In a conference with the Tabagtiache, whose agency
had been at Conejos, Colorado, since 1861, Governor Hunt
agreed, in July, 1868, to deliver the annuity goods "at a
point as near the reserve, as I could approach with wagon,
without a greater outlay than would be allowed by your
Department [office of Indian affairs], in constructing a
wagon road ... " This location was "at a point about fifty
miles, North East of the reservation, just, in the mouth of the
Cochetope pass, which is as near as I can approach the
reserve with wagons witho'ut a considerable outlay, unless
you instruct me to go forward, in compliance with the re·27.

Parker to Cox, 4/8/70, RB 19, p. 297.
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quest of the Chiefs, given before, in which case I shall take
a different route and construct a temporary wagon road to
some eligible point on the reserve where good winter quarters may be found, and where the stock may be kept in
safety."28
Treaty obligations, apparently, rested lightly on Governor Hunt's shoulders. Governor McCook, successor to
Hunt, tried to locate the agency farther west and on the reservation, but the Indians were now an obstacle. The erection
of a sawmill (provided for in the treaty of 1868), they
thought, would frighten away the game, and they were
suspicious of this new move on the part of the white man
whom they claimed had defrauded them in the past. Consequently, the agency was finally located on the west side of
the Cochetopa Pass in the Continental Divide at an altitude
of over 9,000 feet. The place was farther west than the
location of Hunt, but not as far as McCook had planned.
When the true boundary of the reservation was established,
the agency was found to be twelve miles to the east. The
place was snow bound for six months of the year,there was
no farming land within twenty miles to experiment with in
teaching the nomads to cultivate the soil, even the Indian
stock could not be herded nearer than thirty miles most of
the time ;29 on the whole, "the location is as bad almost as
could have been chosen."3o
The location of the agency naturally displeased the
New Mexico officials and they proceeded to cry "fraud,"
pointing out that the real Los Pinos was south of the San
Juan Mountains. 31 They were correct in their geography
and forces were soon at work to force a change. The New
Mexico legislature petitioned the president in March, 1870,
that the agency be located on the Los Pinos proper, because
the Indians refused to cross the mountains to the Coche28. Hunt to Taylor, 7/27/68, Colo. C916/68. Hunt to Taylor, 11/18/68, Colo.
C1090/68.
29. McCook to Parker, 8/25/69, Colo. C448/69, Brunot to Delano in C. 1. A.,
Annual Report, 1873., p. 85. B. I. C., Report, 1872, p. 16.
30. Ibid., p. 108.
3t. Hanson to Clinton, 12/9/69, C761/69. The Daily New Mexican, 10/22/69.
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tapa'; furthermore, their removal northward might irritate
them to the poi'nt of war, and a useful frontier protection
against the Navaho, still looked upon as potential troublemakers, would be removed. The commissioner of Indian
affairs hinted a few months later that the agency would be
relocated,32 and the proposed change was given an additional boost by the board of Indian commissioners in 1872,
when they suggested that the Indians should be located
nearer farm lands; incidentally, the mountain mineral region would be open for exploitation. They pointed out that
, This proposition may he expected to meet with
the opposition both of the settlements in Colorado,
upon which the agency is now, and must continue
to be, dependent for its supplies while it remains;
of the parties in New Mexico, who for similar
reasons desire to retain the Indians in New Mexico,
and who know that they cannot live in the mountains; and of a corporation which looks forward
to acquiring the lands proposed to be thus
occupied. 33
The reference to opposition in New Mexico was based on the
supposition, of course, that an agency at Abiquiu was preferable to the location in southern Colorado even though
south of the San Juan Mountains.
The mention of a mineral region calls to mind the pre,diction made by Superintenderit Collins some years earlier,
that if the mineral country were not ceded by the Indians it
would be taken away from them. That possibility was now
being pressed to a' climax. The miners argued that the Indians disavowed the treaty of 1868 and that they had never
gone onto the reservation, stubbornly maintaining contact
with their respective agencies long located at Abiquiu,
Cimarr6n, and Conejos; therefore, the country was, open
for prospecting. But 'the conclusion was unsound; if the
treaty was valid, they would be legally unable to enter the
mineral country because, unfortunately for them, the treaty
32.
p. 317.
33.

Legislative Memorial" 3/12/70, P357/70;
B. I. C., Annual Report, 1872, p. 17.

Parker to Amy, 6/24/70, LB 96,
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of 1868 did not contain the clause incorporated in the treaty
of 1863 which permitted mining on the reservation. In
either case the Indians must be taken into account because
they lay across the routes into the mineral region. 34
The discovery of gold on the upper Chama River led
the miners to seek the precious metal on the reservation.
Two well-armed parties passed through Tierra Amarilla in
June, 1869, determined, if there was any gold, "it will be got
at this time."35 Within a year over 200 had ventured into
the debatable land. No doubt they were motivated by hope
of personal gain, but there were dreamers on the frontier.
Thes.e Indians being placed on a reservation
U!l1der the control of a good agent and this country
opened for development a vast amount of mineral
wealth will follow from the mountains and a large
population will be sustained, and our Territory
may then be termed the Silver State of the Union
and be a credit to the name of Lincoln by which it is
proposed to honor it.36
The Indians permitted reluctantly the intrusion of the
unwelcome visitors. The Wiminuche, farther to the northwest, were more unfriendly than the Capote; sometimes
they refused to let parties pass. The miners, as temporary
sojourners, were less objectionable thanp.ermanent settlers,
but even they were considered a danger to the supply of
game. 37 However, despite all obstacles, mining operations
were carried on arid the proposal was advanced to secure
relinquishment of the Indian title to the mineral area on
the reservation.
Congress acted on the matter and authorized the opening of negotiations in the spring of 1872, for a cession of
34. Arny to Delano, 5/27/73, A180/73. The Daily New Mexican. 5/26/73. Arny
to Parker, 7/16/69, A285/69.
35. Veritas to Editors, 6/15/69, The Daily New Mexican, 6/22/69.
36. The Daily New Mexican, 7/30/70. Arny to Parker, Report, 7/19/70,
A1235/70.
37. Arny to Pfeiffer, 7/9/69, A285/69. Hanson to Clinton, 7/12/70, C1487/70.
The Daily New Mexican, 5/26/70, 8/4/69.
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the desired country. The perennial Arny 38 with Colonel
Granger and Major W. R. Price held a meeting with the
Ute at the Cochetopa agency on August 28, 1872. After
a four day session, the meeting broke up without any agreement. Arny attributed the failure to the opposition of
Colorado influence based on the view that the status quo
was best for their interest. He was optimistic, however, of
ultimate success and reported that the. Indians manifested
38. Amy's special commission had expired in May, 1869. An appointment B8
a regular agent was blocked ·by the temporary employment of the military. officers,
but he was· determined to return to the government payroll. He first requested an
appointment as· special agent for the Jicarillas (who roamed west of the Rio Grande),
in order to establish an industrial school for the·ir henefit, with "incidental expenses"
of $300 per month, instructions to ~y necessary clothing for the Apache, etc., and to
use his in.fluence, to keep the Ute quiet till agency controversy was settled. I uask a
special appointment, for a special purpose, to prepare th~ way for a special obje~t, •..
because I desire to be placed in a position where I can establish a model industrial
school for Indians," to make them self-sustaining.
.
His first attempt failing, he· wrote to Sidney Clarke, chairman of the house
committee on Indian affairs, for an appointment as superintendent of Navaho schools.
Such
position was in advance of the -times, but Clarke wrote to Parker: HI earne~tly
hope you will take such action as will secure his servi:ces to the government in Borne
important capacity." Consequently, he was recommended for a job lo.cating the
Apache on a reservation, removing the Ute to Colorado, and establishing schools
wherever practicable on reservations. Being a staunch Republican, he received an
appointment in March, 1870.
Amy to Cox, ·1/15/70, and Arny to Sidney Clarke, 2/28/70, 11104/70. Parker
to Cox, 3/7/70, RB 19,p. 231.
As usual he fell under suspicion. The agent in Cimarron figured the agency
expenses for the y·ear at $30,000 exclusive of clothing; Arny reported· $3,000 per
month.
"My (the agent) opinion confidentially expregsed to you is that he is making
arrangements for an immense "job" for hin.tse1f and friends as soon as officers are
relieved from this duty., He made a big ·report of his 'talk' with the Indians at this
agency, whereas the truth is he couldn't get any of the ·Indians to go near him until he
bought a third of a box of Tobacco (which he asked me to pay.for, an honor I respectfully declined) and then was only able to coax about eight of the Apaches into his
room, where he and his son carried on "the talk.' ·He was exceedingly anxious that
no one should be present, but· I rather insisted on intruding. Not one of the Utes
would go near him, as they said he had been their Agent once & robbed them. In
fact both· tribes thoroughly despise and dislike him. When I asked them to go and
talk with him, they said 'they were good friends to the officers & soldiers, but that
they wanted nothing to do with Amy; that he was a Pinip, and talked two ways.'
I am curious to see if he published the same report he showed me. I only tell you
theie things that you may be on your guard with him. I have known .him, and of
him for three or four years & have not the utmoBt confidence in either his honeBty or
vera.city. Every one who speaks of him in this country seems to have about the same
opinions. I cannot understand how lie succeeds in humblugging the Authorities at
Washington so completely as he does." Wilson to Clinton,9/3/70, C1699/70.
Captain W. P. ·Wilson was ordered April 5, 1870. to the Cimarron agency in
place of A. S. B. Keyes.
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the strongest evidence of friendship.3ll But Kaniache said,
Here is Governor Arny, who is present. All the
time he is going to Washington and Santa F'e, and
all the time he is working against us. 40
In addition to remaining confident of success, Arny
pointed out certain ways in which the desired goal could
be reached. The Wiminuche were accused of having murdered Miller, the Navaho agent, and !lad fled to Utah Territory to escape punishment. Arny held that this action
amounted to forfeiting title to the land which consequently
reverted to the United States! Or, pressure could bebrought
to bear on Ouray, chief of the northern Utes; under the
terms of the treaty of 1868 he could be held responsible for
the capture and delivery of the murderers of Miller. Again,
if all rights to hunt and roam outside the boundaries of the
reservation were denied to them, they would be forced to
live on the reservation, but rather than live at Cochetopa
they would agree to anything! He thought that the Capotes and Moache, if negotiated with separately, could be
handled all right. The cession of the desired land would separate the northern and southern Utes, which, in his opinion, would correct their jealousies, prevent war, civilize
them, and permit the development of the mineral resources.
He rightfully pointed (lut that some solution to the problem
was necessary because the in'flux of miners would eventually destroy the IndiansY
The matter hung fire until the following year, but constant pressure was placed on the government to try again.
Chief Ouray was reported in April as favoring a treaty if
his son, ~eld captive by the Arapahoes, was restored to
him. 42 A second commission was finally created June 2,
with Felix Bruno as chairman, and concluded an agreement
39. Arny to Pope, 8/31/72, The DaJly New Mexican, 9/9/72, Arny to Manderfield & Tucker, 9/4/72, Ibid., 9/12/72.
40. B. I. C., Annual Report, 1872, p. 96.
41. Arny to Delano, 9/30/72, A219/72.
42. Dudley to Clum, 1/21/73, D251/73. Clum to Dudley, 2/21/73, LB 110. p.
439. Adams to Smith, 4/28/73, Colo. A111/73.
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September 13 with the Tabaguache, Moache, Capote, and
, Wiminuche; it was ratified by congress on April 29, 1874.
The Bruno agreement contained the following provisions: an area of land was' ceded bounded by a line drawn
from a point on the eastern boundary of the reservation
according to the treaty of 1868, fifteen ,miles north of the
New Mexico-Colorado boundary westward parallel to the
territorial boundary to a point twenty miles due east of the
western boundary of Colorado, thence north to a point ten
miles north of the thirty-eighth parallel, from there due east
to the eastern boundary and south to the beginning point;'
the Indians were granted permission to hunt in the ceded
territory until the game was exhausted and so long as they
remained at peace; the United States agreed to create a
permanent trust fund sufficient to produce an annual income
of $25,000; and to establish an agency on the southern part
of the reservation for the Wiminuche, Capote, and Moache;
the treaty of 1868 was reaffirmed except as altered by the
new agreement; and Ouray was to receive a salary of $1,000
for ten years or while remaining head chief and remaining
at peace. 43
The area ceded embraced the western tip' of the continental Divide wedge and adjacent mountain ranges. It
was supposed, to include the possible mineral area, but it
also extended far enough south to cover part of the farming
land of the San Juan drainage. It is very doubtful that the
Ute would knowingly have ceded land suitable for agriculture, because they certainly did' not welcome a permanent
, population. Again the charge of fraud was made:
The Indians. are very severe upon Ouray and
the Commission,ers making the treaty of 1873:
That these Southern Utes were badly deceived,
~ I have no doubt, but not by Commissioner BrunoL
He did not, as I understand, obtain their signatures, perhaps did not even, see them. Other
parties were sent from Los Pinos (Cochetopa) to
-this place (Tierra Amarilla 1) for that purpose
48.

Kappler, I, 151.
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and it was these parties, as a witness to their signature informs me, who deceived them. 44

But the making of a treaty and its execution continued
to be two quite different matters. 'Both the legalism of the
government and the personal desires of the Indians militated against success. The Capote and Wiminuche continued to deny the validity of the agreement of 1868 and
refused to' go to the Cochetopa agency for their annuity
goods. They continued to visit the agency at Abiquiu, particularly the Capote. The Wiminuche, living farther afield
where the game was more abundant, were inclined to be
more independent of government aid.
Since contact with the settlements was inevitable so
long as the Ute came to Abiquiu, conditions continued to be
detrimental to the Indians and annoying to the whites.
Trouble was bound to occur sooner or later. When game
was scarce and government rations were insufficient, the
nomad appropriated stock. "Lo, the poor Indian," had been
stealing, was a common complaint. Perhaps worse might
happen if it was true that "the Indians were accostumed to
abuse the citizens in every possible manner, frequently
shooting down stock in the corrals and offering indignities
to defenceless women ... "45
On the whole the Capote and Wiminuche were peacefully inclined, merely displaying an exasperating stubbornnes's in refusing to move onto the reservation. So peaceful,
in fact, that the army au'thorities ordered the abandonment
of Fort Lowell in June, 1869. A few' citizens in Rio Arriba
protested; but it was a sound move,46 troops only being recalled twice to preserve order.
The need for food led some of the younger Capote to
steal stock, in the spring of 1872, on a larger scale than
usual. Company K of the:8th cavalry, stationed at Fort
44. Russell to Commissioner. 6/21/76. R198/76. See also Hatch to A. A. G.,
9/30/76, W1148/76.
45. The Daily New Mexican, 3/29/72, 7/3/69.
46. Hanson to Clinton, 8/16/69. C419/69. But see Arny to Parker, 7/7/69.
A279/69.
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Wingate, was ordered to Tierra Amarilla in April. A meeting with Chief Sabato and thirty followers ended in a brisk
skirmish. The authorities had demanded the cessation of
depredations, the return of the stolen stock, and the surrender of the thieves. Rather than precipitate a fight at once,
the officers resorted to strategy. The lieutenant in command
asked for eight warriors to accompany him to Santa Fe to
have a talk. "I did this at the suggestion of Major Armstrong, their Agent," he said, "as we conceived that it
would be a good plan to obtain Sabato and some of his warriors as hostages for the delivery of thieves' and stolen
stock." Upon the refusal of the Indians to accede to the proposal, the military attempted to arrest the band. They broke'
through the cordon of soldiers, secured more help, and invited the officers to have a fight. The invitation was 'accepted; as a result, one Indian was killed and one white man
woundedY
General Granger arrived on May 17 and definitive
terms were laid down by the military calling for the surrender of 'the thieves and the return of the stolen stock. The
insistence on these demands and the general desire' of the
Indians to remain at peace brought results during the summer months: at least one thief was given up and sQme
horses and cattle were brought in. The whole incident was
more of a tempest in a teapot than a serious threat of an
Indian outbreak. 48
But such a "tempest" was not a welcome matter. In
order to prevent a recurrence in the ,future the Indians
must· receive rations from th El government to supplement
their game supply. This placed Washington in a dilemma
47. L D. Stevenson to A. A, A. G., 5/6/72, I1475/72. Armstrong to Pope.
5/6/72, P830/72. The Daily New Mexican, 4/4/72.
'
J. S. Armstrong served as agent at Abiquiu from the summer of 1871 to the
spring of 1873. He was nominated for the position by the Presbyterian board for
foreign missions and resigned under pr~sBure from the superintendent. LB 102.
p. 436, 549, A279/73, D129/73.
48. The Daily New Mexican, 5/27/72, 7/5/72. John W. Pullman to A. A. A. G.,
6/2/72, W6/72, O. O. Howard to Pope, 6/13/72, P26/72. Pope to Armstrong,
7/1/72, P26/72.
Pope to Walker, 7/7/72, P26/72.
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because the agents had been instructed that· "treaty" Indians would be supplied only on the reservation, and they
must be induced to go there "notwithstanding the efforts of
outside and interested parties to induce them not to do SO."49
But the Indians refused to go; so when Agent Hanson
signed a contract to feed the Ute at Abiquiu in the winter
of 1869-1870, it was disallowed by Commissioner Parker.
He, however, was subsequently forced to permit small purchases in open market, provided funds were available, until
another attempt could be made to make the Ute change their
minds; "if the Indians stilI. refuse to go to their new reservation, the matterwilI be further considered by the Department."50 By the· end of the year he was about ready to
surrender:
'
The Department having exhausted its persuasive power to incline them to a cheerful compliance
with their treaty. stipulation in this respect, without avail, I respectfully recommend that appropriate legislation be asked of Congress to· relieve the
Department and the Indians from the unpleasant
.dilemma in which both are involved, and that
authority be given to aggregate the bands in question in some district in New Mexico which will be
satisfactory to them."51
The Brunot agreement, by providing for an agency
south of the San Juan mountains, was the next step in
solving the problem. .The special commissioner had recognized that to move the Ute to the Cochetopa agency
"would be unjust,and a needless cruelty" ;52 therefore,. in
the· summer of 1876 the agency was moved to the head of
the Uncompaghre Valley, southwest from Cochetopa, nearer
to the San Juan couIitry, but stilI north of the main moun. tain mass. A year later a location was selected south of the
49.
60.
51.

52.

Parker to Clinton, 11/23/69, LB 93, p. 15I.
Parker to Clinton, 1/8/70, and 1/31/70, LB 93, p. 318, 397.
C.I.A., Annual Report, 1870, p. 5.
C.I.A.,· Annual Report, 1873, p. 85.
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San Juan mountains, on the Rio de los Pinos, 53 and the
agency was now known as the Southern Ute agency.
Meanwhile, the evil influence of the whites became so
pronounced that an early idea of removing the old agency
from Abiquiu to Tierra Amarilla was revived in order to
eliminate the necessity of the Indians· passing through the
settled area around Abiquiu. Agent Hanson also urged the
change on the grounds that the buildings at old Fort Lo:well
would rent for $50 less per year, and were more suitable;
the agent. would have some tillable land, fine grazing, and
fuel, and supplies could be purchased more reasonably.
Armstrong renewed the recommendation and approval was
fina:Ily given in the summer of 1872. 54
.
With the long delay in executing the terms of the treaty,
the conditions of the Wiminuche and Capote became increasingly worse. The women and children cried around the
agency' for food, which was dealt out sparingly, being purchased from the. small regular appropriation made' for the
New Mexico agencies. 55
Their case [Ute and Jicarillas] is a deplorable
o:ne. If this .board could do anything to secure
their being placed on a reservation of their own it
would be doing a great work for them. They are
now living in the open territory where anybody
else may live, and the New Mexicans and SpanishAmericans are living among them ; many of these
are making their fortunes by sellhig liquor, as we
find; and our agent reports that it is extremely
difficult to secure from the Government a proper
reguiation as to these matters. We have one of the
53. C. I. A., Annual Report, 1875, p. 98-99. F. H. Weaver, Report, 8/27/77, 45
Congo 2 sess. Hse, Ex. Doc. I, VIII, 441 (1800). See also 44 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex."
.
Doc. I, .IV, 422 (1749).
54. Hanson, Report, 9/3/70, 41 Congo 3 sess.·Hse. Ex. Doc.. 1, I, 619-622 (1449).
Hanson to Parker, 2/10/71, H200/71. Armstrong to' Pope, 4/30/72, P863/72.
Delano to Walker, 6/18/72, I1521/72.
The agency continued to be designated as the AbiquiU agency after the removal
to' Tierra Amarilla.
55. Hanson to Clinton, 3/29/70, C/1173/70 and 10/4/70, CI773/70. Clinton to
Parker,' 10/10/70, CI577/70.
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very best of men there as an. agent [Russell],
and he finds his position very embarrassing. 56

But events were moving to a climax. The increasing
population due to the attractions of the mining region and
farming country were hastening matters.
The Brunot
agreement had reserved a strip of country along the New
Mexico-Colorado boundary line for the Indians. In order
to reach the mines it was necessary to cross this territory,
and the Indian grazing lands were made use of by the travelers who, in some cases, were not above settling on the more
fertile portions. Again in the summer of 1876, hostilities
were imminent and the settlers petitioned for troops, whom
the agent was empowered to call for when assistance was
deemed necessary. In this .case Russell left the final decision up to General Hatch,. who dispatched to the scene of
trouble a few soldiers, but .the incident passed without seri-'
ous trouble. Money would have been more useful than
troops, of course. As the agent complained, when he had
expected in the spring instructions that would quiet the Ute,
he had been informed instead, "No more money can be
furnished yoU."57
56. Dr. Lowrie in B. I. C., Annual Report, 1874, p. 123.
Russell's predecessors had had t~e same problems of course.
UTE INDIAN AGENCY
Abiquiu, New Mexico
. March 18th, 1872
I. Any person found havingr in their possession articles of Indian goods, ammu~
nition, clothing, grain, etc., etc., obtained from the Capote and Weminutche Utes,
the same shall he returned to the agency at Abiquiu and the parties will be prosecuted
to the full extent of the law.
II. . Any liquor dealers or others who are known to sell liquor to these Indians,
will be prosecuted and made to suffer the full penalty of the law.
J. S. ARMSTRONG,
U. S. Indian Agent.
The Daily New Mexican, 3/23/72. S. A. Russell was appointed to the Abiquiu
agency in August, 1874.
5'7. Russell to Commissioner, 3/13/76, R91/76. Russell to E. Hatch, 9/28/76.
R363/76. Russell to Commissioner, 10/16/76, R363/76.
The agents now corresponded directly with the commissioner at Washington
because the superintendency of New Mexico had been abolished 6/30/74. Smith to
Delano, 7/15/74, RB 24, p. 490. The last superintendent, L. E. Dudley, had succeeded Nathaniel Pope, November, 1872, assuming charge in December.
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However, the pressing needs of the Ute did finally
bring some relief. For the year 1876 only, the sum of
$10,000 was allotted from the treaty funds, despite the fact
that the Indians w.ere not yet officially on the reservation.
But that event was not far off ; the agency was soon to be
moved, and the fear of former years of an Indian war had
now practically passed away, since the Ute were considered
as being too weak for real resistance, it being calculated
that they could not bring into the field three hundred armed
men. In the face of this decline in strength, force could
be used to move them without precipitating a conflict. On
the whole, a policy of conciliation and observance of the .
treaty provisions rather than compulsion pervaded the
ranks of the New Mexico officials toward these northern
Indians in the middle of the 18708. Superintendent Dudley
was even advocating the adoption of the Golden Rule. 58
But golden rule or otherwise, the final roundup of the
Ute and their ally, the Jicarillas, was drawing near.
58. Dudley to Smith, 10/27/74, in C. I. A., Annual Report, 1874. p. 304;
also ibid., 1875, p. 4. Hatch to A. A. G.• 9/30/76. W1148/76.
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CHAPTER VII
THE MOACHE UTE AND JICARILLA APACHE

in northeastern New Mexico, became the
C IMARRON,
rendezvous for the Moache Ute and Jicarilla Apache

after the removal of the agency from Taos in 1862 by Arny.
According to the terms of the Tabaguache treaty of 1863,
the Moache might locate on the reservation set aside in the
San Luis valleY,Colorado. They declined to leave their old
haunts, however, and continued to be the cronies of the Jicarillas, sharing the rations that were intermittently issued
by the government. As with the other tribes, conditions
were unsatisfactory, both to the Indian and the white man,
and the usual complaints were heard: "While nominally at
peace they [the Indians] commit crimes and outrages of
every kind with entire impunity, because there is no law
which can reach them promptly, and efficiently."l
The arrival of Superintendent Norton in New Mexico
in June, 1866, two years after the above complaint was
registered, was an interesting event for several reasons: he
,illustrated the weakness of the system of inexperienced
political appointees, made clear in sharp terms the destitute
condition of the Indians, l:tnd brought to light the inadequate
financial support given to thework of the Indian service in
New Mexico. Faced with savages almost naked because no
. goods had. heEm issued for nearly a year, and verging on
starvation for the lack of game and opposition of the Plains
. Indians to their chasing the buffalo, "What am I to do?"
he asked. "What is the cheapest food to give them?" "Write
me immediately ... & tell me what to do," he demanded,
"I'm lost."2 And to add to his harassment there was no
agent at Cimarron at the time: In desperation he ordered
L. B. Maxwell, a rancher, to feed the Indians to the maxi1. Watrous to Steck. 3/10/64, 1524/64.
The commissioner at this time answered the complaint of Watrous by stating
that the Indians were subject to the same laws and process of punishment as the
white man. Watrous had said that the Intercourse Law of 1834 was a dead letter.
Usher to Dole. ibid.
2. Norton to Cooley, 6/24/66. N48/66..
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mum cost .of $500 per month until' further instructions
arrived from Washington.
The plight of Norton was an old story, to the commissioner and he took the officially correct and necessary step of
disapproving the expenditure:
It is commendable to feed the hungry and relieve the destitute; but this Department has no
pow.er to do so except so far as Congress may place
funds at, its disposal fo'r that object. The annual
appropriation for the Indian Service in New Mexico' (aside from that for the Navajos [)] is
$50,000. When over $20,000 of this is expended
for goods, and the cost of transporting the goods
is paid out of it. the residue, as you will perceive,
will not be sufficient to justify any such expenditure as you have instituted as Maxw.ells.
Experience has demonstrated that so long as,
Indians are fed at public expense' they will make
little or no efforts to sustain themselves. Besides,
it has not been, and cannot be the policy of the
Department to subsist Indians whose habits are
nomadic and whose hunting grounds are unlimited.

Moreover, the indebtedness that the superintendency had
fallen into in the past must not occur again, he wrote. The
wh(jI~ matter ina nutshell was "not a question of humanity,
but of law."3
But the matter was also something else; it might be a
matter of war, that chronic cry along the Indian frontier in
New Mexico. And if war occurred, "I wash my hands of all
blame in the matter," Norton said. The superintendent, of
course, was in a more uncomfortable position than the
commissioner. He saw at first-hand the actual state of
affairs and was the immediate buffer for the complaints of
,the Indians demanding food and the cry of the settlers
demanding protection for their flocks. "I regTet," he wrote
"that I am to be cursed, and overrun by a daily unceasing
throng of filthy, lousy, nacked and starving Indians, crying
aloud for food' ... [and] without the authority or ability to
3,

Cooley to Norton, 7/19/66, LB 8i,

p,

'8,
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alleviate their sufferings;" all, he thought, on account of a
lack of confidence in his integrity and judgment by Commissioner Cooley.4 In criticizing his immediate superior, he
was hasty; conditions were bad and morally wrong, but the
commissioner was far from being free to handle the problem
according to dictates of wisdom and humanity.
Point was given to the superintendent's complaint by
the killing of a Ute in August. The Indian had asked a
rancher for a sheep; when refus.ed, a quarrel had followed
and the savage was killed. His kinsman went to Fort Union,
where the killer was taken for protection, and demanded
blood for blood. Instead of the Mosaic law, however, the
regular judicial procedure was followed. The evidence presented to the grand jury at Mora appeared insufficient for
indictment, so the dispute was transferred to Santa Fe,
where a compromise was affected. The superintendent paid
$400 to the brother of the dead man for distribution among
the relatives. A rather high price, Norton thought, but it
was preferable to war. 5
This affair was used in an attempt to budge the commissioner from his position.
I know not what may be the result of this
trial, Norton wrote, but do know that it originated
in .the refusal of the Department to sanction my
action in feeding them . . . I have had my doubts
whether you read the communication [an unjust
doubt] or fully contemplated the injustice, and the
result of your decision, as indicated in your letter
to me of the 19th ult...."
He recommended at least $1,000 per month for each agency
on the grounds that "These Indians-at both places [Abiquiu and Cimarron?] are absolutely starving, and they must
steal ... ,"6 which, of course, would only result in retaliation
with force.
4. Norton to Cooley, 8/15/66, N83/66.
6. Arny to Cooley, 8/23/66, and Amy to Norton. 9/4/66, A304/66.
Agreement with Utah, 9/80/66, N107/66.
6. Norton to Cooley, 8/30/66, N89/66.
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The commissioner was not to be moved. The lack of
funds was an unanswerable argument in his opinion. He
closed the matter by criticising Norton for having acted
:precipitately; he also pointed out the impossibility of maintaining the payments of $500 per month, particularly if the
same practice were adopted toward the other tribes in New
Mexico, and admonished the superintendent for losing his
femper. 7 The apparent impasse was solved by the military.
General Carleton was keenly aware of the necessity of
feeding the Indians in order to keep them from depredating'
and possibly causing a general uprising. He was very reluctant to wage war and adopted the more salutary method of
issuing rations. Instructions to this effect were forwarded
to Lieutenant George 1. Camphell on August 25; at the
same time the Indians were informed that the slightest .hostility would mean an end to the food supply. The ration
issued amounted to one-half pound of beef and one-half
pound of wheat meal per day to man, woman, or child, at a
cost of about $3,000.a month. Norton immediately claimed
that he could have kept the cost down to $1,000 a month;8
and he probably could, the cost being partly a matter of
the generosity of the giver.
Lieutenant Campbell with a detachment of troops had
been stationed at Cimarron in August at the request of Maxwell, because the Indians were unruly. Sometime after their
arrival, a drunken Indian initiated a quarrel with two soldiers; nothing serious resulted. But the military did not
feel that it was their real task to manage the Indians; hence
the need of an agent was felt. This situation was remedied
with the arrival of Erasmus B. Dennison in November. 9
7. Cooley to Norton, 9/15/66 and 8/22/66, LB 81, p. 219, 375.
Cooley, of course, was not unsympathetic in the matter: ffHumanity and economy
both can for every effort to prevent a war; but to exceed the means at the disposal
of the Dept. in doing so would be making promises which we hav~ no means, nor
prospects of means to fulfil. This must not be done." Cooley to Norton, .9/17/66,
LB 81, p. 379.
8. Carleton to Campbel1, 8/25/66, A304/66. Brevet Maj. Chas. McClure to De
Forrest, 9/25/67, N167/67. Norton to Cooley, 9/12/66, N100/66.
9. Dennison to Norton, 7/1/67, 40 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, II, 197~98
(1324) .
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Relations between the whites and Indians became more
amicable for the time being and the officials. turned their
thoughts to the matter of a reservation for the Jicarillas and
the disposal of the Moache.
Several proposals for the location of the reservation
were advanced. Norton favored the purchase of the Maxwell Grant because "It, is useless to talk of removing them
elsewhere; they, would resist to the last extremity, and four
times the cost of Grant,' $250,000, would be spent in less
than one year in fighting to remov,e them."lO The proposed
site was forty miles' wide and sixty miles long, .with 3,000
acres ~nder cultivation, a flour mill erected at a cost of
$50,000, a saw mill, and other buildings.u Carleton also favored a reservation east of the Sangre de Cristo mountains
since it was cheaper to feed the Indians there; furthermore,
removing them from the settlements to escape the influence
of the white man was a waste of time because settlements
would follow them,12.a view hardly consistent with his policy
toward the Navaho.
The alternative to the Maxwell grant was the Ute reservation in Colorado or some other location. The Moache
logically belonged with their brethren, but the Jicarillas
were more of a problem. They had been at one time attached
to the Abiquiu agency. Arny brought them east of the Rio
Grande in 1861. One band, however~ returned west, sometimes visiting the agency there and at other times coming to
Cimarr6n. 13 They did not get along any too well with the
Ute, so the proposal to locate. them in Colorado was eventually abandoned. In 1868 Governor Hunt advised the Washington office that the Jicarillas should be placed on a reser10. C. I. A., Annual Report, 1867, p. 191.
'
11. Norton to Cooley, 10/10/66, N119/66.
The removal of the Indians from their usual haunts was generally regarded as
involving considerable .difficulty, evcn war. Davis to Taylor, 6/6/68, DI246/68. Getty
to A. A. G., 10/23/67, A. G. 0., LS, p. 345.
.
The Ute were regarded as hrave fighters and stout enemies until their numbers
decreased so much in the 1870'8.
Kit Carson considered them the best shots in the
country_
12. Carleton to Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock, 11/17/66, A. G. 0., LS 43. p. 8.
13. Arny to Taylor, 1/29/68, A368'j68. N. H. Davis, Report, 1868, W26/69.
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vation in the Territory of Utah. This suggestion was passed
on to Special Agent Amy with instructions to try to carry
it out if the earlier proposal to send them to Colorado could
not be realized. 14
Amy failed to accompHsh anything and brought himself under suspicion as usual. He ~ndeavored in a secret
council with the Jicarillas
to make a treaty with them to go upon a reservation in the northern part of New Mexico, as he
reported to me, but as, reported by Wemnedals,
a principal chief, it was to move to Colorado. No
treaty was made; these Indians wisely said it was
necessary to have all the headmen of the tribe ... 15
The regular agents objected to hi~ meeting with the separate bands in secret, a procedure which did not improve the
prospects of success. He finally reported to Washington
that the Jicarillas refused to go on a reservation in Colorado, but would accept a permanent location in New Mexico.
The suggestion of placing them in Utah apparently was not
considered. 16
At the end of the year 1869 the military ceased to feed
the Indians and the government tried to force the Moache
to go on the Colorado reservation by stopping supplies at
Cimarron. When they returned from the hunt in January,
1869, and found out the new policy, they promptly resorted
to the old tactics of killing cattle. It was generally agreed
·among the New Mexico officials that they could be moved
only by force, and it was believed that supplies must be
issued or war would result, an idea that was held by at
least one citizen of the neighboring territory: Judge Hayden
of Tabeguache Mills, Colorado, was convinced that "we are
on the eve of one of the most gigantic indian wars of the
age." "Don't think I am humbuging you, these are facts."
An exclamation point might· have made it more emphatic,
14. Hunt to Taylor. 11/11/68'. Colo. C1079/68. Hunt to Taylor. 11/12/68. Coh
01080/68. Taylor to Amy. 11/21/68. LB 88. p. 814. Amy to Taylor. 12/6/68,
A681/68. Hunt to Taylor. 12/12/68. Colo. C1131/68.
15. Davis in C. I. A.. Annual Report. 1869. p. 256.
16. Amy to Taylor. 1/14/69. A33/69.
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but its substance was slight because the agents at Cimarron
and Abiquiu reported that their Indians were quiet. Moreover, the superintendent had promptly resumed the feeding
policY,17 and General Getty as early as December had stationed 100 men at Cimarron.
The general situation was further complicated by the
sale of the Maxwell grant to an English colonizing company.
It was doubtful that they would submit to the impositions of
the Indians as patiently as Maxwell had done ; he claimed
that they had cost him thousands of dollars because bribery
was preferable to force in maintaining friendly relations.
Furthermore, the sale of the land meant that intensive colonizing would result in a further influx of whites in addition to those attracted by the mines around Elizabethtown.
The company soon learned that trouble cOl,lld arise. A
Jicarilla was killed by an employe ·and the resulting claim
for redress was settled for the sum of $30 in cash, $70 worth
of goods, and two ponies. The agent then warned. the Indians to stay out of the town of Cimarron after dark and
threatened to lock them up in the jail that was shortly to be
constructed.18 The law of the whites was steadily encroaching on their freedom of movement.
After less than a year's service, Agent Roedel 19 summarized the situation at Cimarron in a very informative
letter:
17. Daniel J. Hayden to Wm. Craig, 3/16/70, A873/70. Clinton to Parker•.
11/2/69, C658/69; 12/4/69. C730/69; 5/14/70, C1326/70. Maxwell to Grier. 12/7/69.
C798/69.
.
. 18. Wilson to Clinton. 9/11/70. C1699/70. Arny to Parker, 9/12/70. A1370/70.
Roedel to Pope. 3/27/7i. P195/71.
.
.
If the possibility of war was exaggp.rated in those days, individual experiences
could develop a feeling that the Indian was an undesirable neighhor: "A Jicarilla
Indian was reeently killed on the trail between EI Embudo and 'faos. under the
following circumstances: The Indian had stolen a mare from onc Antonio Griego,
but the theft having been almost immediately discovered. he was hotly pursued and
soon came up with. when he threw down his bow ·and arrows in sign of surrender.
and walked to meet his pursuers with a large knife eon cealed in the folds of his
blanket; on drawing near to them he attempted to pull out his knife, when he was
shot through the head and instantly killed." The Daily New Mexican, 3/28'/70.
19. Erasmus B. Dennison, superseded as agent when the policy of appointing
army officers was adopted, was reappointed in September. 1870. He was shortly
removed on the charge of habitual drunkenness and was suceeeded by Charles F.
Roedel, in December. on the recommendation of the Presbyterian Board. John Collinson to Sherman. 10/1/70. A1403/70. Parker to Delano. 11/1/70. RB 20, p. 41.
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My task of keeping them quiet thus far has
not been a small one. Last fall they were assured
by unscrupulous men that their annuity goods
were on the way here in order to pacify them about
the sale of the Maxwell Grant. When I took charge
of the Agency in last December without a blanket,
or a shirt, or a pound of tobacco & without a single
dollar that could be expended for such, they gradually settled in the belief that I had appropriated
their goods to my private use, certainly not a very
pleasant state of things for a new Agent. I have
patiently born it all & labored for their good
amidst many discouragments hoping that the Government would see the absolute necessity of supp,lying them liberally this fall.
I exceedingly regret to learn that no portion
of the appropriation of $30,000 for clothing &
blankets for the seven bands of Ute Indians is
to be expended for the benefit of the Mouache Utes
of this Agency. It may be that there are legal objections to a division of said appropriation on account
of the treaty of March 2, 1868. If such objections
exist & :ire insurmountable & their is no other
way to appropriate $2,500 or $3,000 for blankets,
clothing etc for the Mouache Ute & Jicarilla Apache
Indians of this Agency, then it will be well for the
Government to make the necessary arrangements
for a war next spring if not sooner, not merely
with the Indians of this Agency but with all the
Ute tribes for there is a perfect understanding
among them in regard to this matter. Leaving the .
.most important point, that of the fearfull loss of
life in such an event, entirely out of sight, this
matter becomes a mathematical question whether
it is cheaper for the Government to payout hundreds of thousands of dollars to fight Indians or to
appropriate about $3,000 to half naked Indians,
who have been friendly for many years & as far
as I know have not even been accused of murdering a citizen during that time.
The two Indians of the Mouache Utes, who's
names are signed to the treaty of March 2, 1868
were induced to go to Washington without even
the knowledge of the tribe & cIa'im that they never
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signed said treaty & in this statement they are
. supported by Urah the main chief of all the Utes,
who spend several weeks here this summer &
named to me a prominent man who made the signatures. The above mentioned two Utes are not
living with the tribe to this day, a fact showing
clearly the bitter feeling of the tribe in regard to
this fraud perpetrated upon them. They have during the winter season actually suffered & waited
patiently nearly three years for the Government to
relieve their pressing wants. They cannot obtain
the means to buy clothing with around here, as
there is hardly a deer or an antelope within 25
miles of this Agency. The Country is being l'apidly
settled & the settlers feeling the strength of numbers deem small provocation sufficient cause to
shoot down an Indian.
The Indians are here & must live; they will
no sooner freeze or starve than a white· man as
long as they can obtain the means of living either
by stealth or force. I have previously done all that
official duty requires of m'e, but christian duty to
my fellow men requires that for the sake of the
life & property of the settlers & the success of the
Indian Policy of the Government I should make
every effort to prevent an outbreak & for this
reason I make this communication & beg your
favorable endorsement of this most important
matter, that relief may be granted speedily, for
without such relief we have nothing but inevitable
war before us. 20
.

Soon after penning these lines, Roedel resigned from
his position because the salary' of $1,500 was inadequate;
it was not enough to meet his expenses. He was not a seeker
after the position in the usual sense, but had responded to
an appeal of the Presbyterian Board, broadcast in their
paper, that men. were needed to staff the Indian agencies.
Doubtless he was attracted by the "higher motive" that Dr.
Lowrie considered an agent should be governed by.21 His
20. Roedel to Pope, 7/26/71, P382/71.
21. Conference with Missionary Societies, Arlington House, Washington. 1/11/72,
in B. 1. C., Report, 1871, p, 171. Lowrie to Walker, 2/26/72, I1210/72.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

/

177

resignation was accepted in the spring of 1872, and Superintendent Pope in the fall appointed R. H. Longwill, a resident of Cimarron and a director of the English company, in
temporary charge. 22
Almost immediately upon his appointment, Pope had
advanced the suggestion that the Jicarillas be removed to
the southern Apache reservation and that the Moache attach themselves to the Abiquiu agency. The board of Indian
commissioners approved the proposal and the superintendent was instructed in November, 1871, to effect the
removals. Agent Pfeiffer made contact with the Moache who
were visiting at the Cochetopa agency and reported their
refusal to abandon the Cimarron country. In March, Roedel
conversed with the_chiefs of the Jicarillas and received the
same reply. If the attempt were made, however, he believed
that a force of troops should be ordered to Cimarron to
protect the settlers, otherwise nothing more should be done
about the matter.
Pope was not satisfied with the reports and dispatched
Emil Fritz. in April as a special investigator. He talked
with, Kaniache and received substantially the same answer
as Pfeiffer had reported from Colorado. They were willing
only to consider a reservation in the Cimarron country. He
was more optimistic in regard to the Jicarillas, but had difficulty in finding them because they had shunned the neighborhood of Cimarron when told of smallpox by parties "no
doubt interested."23
22. Pope to Walker, 11/8/72, P216/72. Dudley to Smith, 4/10/73. D17/73,
Nathaniel Pope was appoint.ed superintendent in October, 1870. He served two
years. His subsequent attempt to supersede Dudley was regarded unfavorably in some
Qua:rters: "the consummation of Buch an iniquitous thing 11'1.USt be prevented at aU
~azardB." "For the sake of the church. the Indians, the Government, anti the President's Indian Policy do not let Col. Pope be reinstated."
D. S. MeFarlanel to O. o.
Howard, 3/17/73, H43/73.
23. Fritz to Pope, 1872, P7/72. Pope to Parker, 12/30/70, 1'66/70: Acting
Secretary of Interior to Clum, 11/13/71, 1985/71. Roedel to Pope, 3/22/72,
P789/72. Pfeiffer to Pope 9/6/72, P173/72. Clum to Pope 11/15/71, LR 103, p. 291.
..It is calculated that an agent can make a fortune during a term of four years:
how they can do it remains a mystery." North AmeJ'ican Review. X.C, 75. (Jan.
1860.)
Lieutenant A. J. Alexander wrote in 1866 from Santa Fe that it was a well
known fact that not one-half of the presents reached the Indians. ~l~"ander to F. A.
Dick, 12/11/16, B107/67.
~ut
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The "interested" parties must have been few in num:"
ber. The prevailing sentiment in the country was in favor
of removing the Indians. The Maxwell Land Company was
fearful of losing settlers who were annoyed by the Indians.
FiIrthermore, they made a nuisance of themselves lounging
around Cimarron and getting drunk, fortunate if they did
not get intd more serious difficulty. The tension was again
heightened in the summer of 1872 when tl).e possibility of
the government once more suspending the rations was in
the air. In this case, however, the superintendent was
authorized to use his own judgment about the necessity of
feeding his charges until the removal was effeCted. Finally,
the Jicarillas did make a' promise to go to Fort Stanton
when they returned from the hunt in December. If they
were sincere, it was high time, Pope thought: "The pernicious influences about Cimarron render it impossible to control the Indians, and as it is growing worse I am making
every effort to accomplish their removal."24 But the Jicarilla did not go to Fort Stanton. The next superintendent,
Dudley, favored the same policy, but was soon led to make
further suggestions because the Indians were again becoming a serious worry in the spring of 1873. Wandering back
and forth across the New Mexico-Colorado boundary, they
annoyed the settlers in both territories, "and the settlers
universally desire their removal." 25 To satisfy this desire;
at least to the extent of persuading Kaniache's band to
return to their proper headquarters at Cimarron from the
Arkansas river, J. L~ Gould was sent to Colorado in April.
The Moache complained. to him that it was necessary to
depredate in order to live, a statement that carried little
weight with him. He recomemnded that a force of troops be
dispatched to protect the settlers.
24. Pope to Walker, 10/16/72. P173/72.· The Cimarron New.. 9/14/72. in
W375/72. Collinson to W. Belknap. 9/27/72 W375/72. Clum to Pope. 10/19/72.
LB 110. p. 38..
The News thought that the settlers would be very pleased if the Indians went
to a· Terrestial paradise 500 miles a way.
25. Dudley to Smith, 4/10/73. D17/73.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

i

179

The Washington office was reluctant to apply force.
Instead, the superintendent was advised to persuade them
to go on the reservation by explaining the benefits: If still
unsuccessful, he could then 'try to remove both the Jicarillas
and Moache to a location on the Dry Cimarron, in the northeastern corner of the Territory, where they would act as a
barrier against the .Comanche, according to Dudley. But a
military post would be required there to keep them settled,
and the government could not authorize such an expense.
Dudley was favorable to the policy' of persuasion rather
than force, but he came to the end of his patience in June.
He visited southern Colorado to hold a council with the
recalCitrant band and found the settlers in· the Cuchara
valley arming. against the Indians. The superintendent issued some rations and ordered Kaniache to go to the Coche:'
topa agency and never return to that region again. He had
no sooner returned to Santa Fe than reports arrived of their
return, so he called upon the military for aid. The Indians
were sent 'flying northward as they had been ordered previously to do and troops were stationed in the Spanish
.Peaks country for the rest of the summer. Washington had
finally authorized' force as a 'last resort, and the band of
Kaniache, sadly reduced in numbers, thought discr~tion .f:l:!e
better part of valor. 26
Along with these difficulties several changes of agents
took place at Cimarron: Longwill was succeeded by Gould
in March, 1873, because it was thought inadvisable to have a
director of the Maxwell company that had the contract to
feed the Indians superintend its performance. Gould in turn
was superseded by Thomas A. Dolan in~August. In addition
to his regular-: appointment, Dolan was shortly commissioned as a special agent ~o negotiate a treaty for the
removal of the Jicarilla. This move was made unknown to
26. Clum to Dudley, 4/28/73, LB 112, p. 180. Dudley to Smith, 6/27/73.
D304/73; .6/28/73, D265/73; 7/9/73, D267/73; 5/8/73. L1l1/73. Gould to Dudley,
5/3/73. Dudley to Pope,· 6/28/73, 1453/73. Alexander to A. A. A. G., 7/8/73,
D304/73. Dudley to Commissioner, 7/5/73. D251/73.
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Dudley, who naturally was surprised and, a bit irritated. 27
Acting under detailed instructions from Washington,
Dolan proceeded to Abiquiu to make contact withthe western Jicarillas; then he returned and secured the signatures
of the chiefs who hung around Cimarron, Jose Largo and
San Pablo. The boundary of the reservation extended along
the San Juan river from where it crossed the Colorado line
to the eastern boundary of the Navaho reservation, thence
north to the territorial boundary and east to the beginning
point. This area was set aside by Executive Order on March
25, 1874. 28
The treaty further provided that other Indians friendly
to the Jicarillas might locate there, but no unauthorized persons should ever intrude; the ,United States agreed to pay
$5,000 annually for five years, and $30,000 annually for the
next ten years for education; the Indians agreed to relinquish their claim to all other lands and promised to send
their children to school; if the Ute agreed, the Jicarillas
would be attached to the agency in southern Colorado; the
government promised to punish according to law those
whites who committed wrongs and to pay damages, and
Indian wrongdoers were to be punished ina similar way;
roads and railroads could be constructed across the reservation; and no payments were to be made unless the Indians
were living at peace on the reservation. It was signed by
forty-three members of the tribe. 29
The signing of a 'treaty did not necessarily mean the
immediate removal of the Jicarillas any more than in the
case of the Ute. They were yet to roam their native haunts
for several years with the usual difficulties. The territorial
legislature passed a hypocritical resolution 30 to the effect
27. Dudley to Smith. 4/10/73. DI7/73; 5/8/73, D94/73; 3/15/73. D372/7S;
12/4/73, D893/73.
28. Kappler, I. 874.
29. Jicarilla Apache Treaty, December 12. 1873, Land Record Section of Land
Division 'of Office of Indian Affairs. Unratified Treaty Book. Dolan to Smith.
12/21/73. D6/73.
This 'letter of Dec. 21 1873. Dolon to Smith. with draft of the treaty was published in NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. III (Jan'y 1929), 59-71.
SO. Transmitted 3/23/74 to the secretary of interior and C.I.A., R200/74.
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that the people were generally friendly and sympathetic
toward them, and recommended that a permanent agent be
stationed at Cimarron and an attempt made to civilize them
and the Ute. The people, of course, no doubt were sympathetic, but as neighbors the Jicarillas were unwelcome; and
the task of civilizing them in the Cimarron environment,
where whiskey flowed freely and the traders exploited them,
was a doubtful experiment.
Another attempt was made in the summer of 1874 to
break up the whiskey traffic. One day in June, six Ute went
on a spree and three were killed before the affair ended.
One Indian killed the other two and was in turn executed by
order of a chief. Maurice Tra.uer was indicted and tried for
selling' the' liquor, but was acquitted. Longwili recommended that the government employ a private detective in
the person of Robert Grigsby to secure evidence against
such lawbreakers. This was acted upon favorably in
AugusL 31 Grigsby apparently did not solye the problem
because a Mrs. Margaret Wilson was arrested in the spring
of 1875 "for about the forty-eleventh time on this charge
"32

Perhaps the situation called for an agent who could
measure up' to the ideal of Commissioner Smith, who
thought he should be "a man of nerve and hard sense, who
has gone to his agency with the ruling purpose .to do good,
who believes that an Indian is a fellow-man ...," and who
would be guided by the principles that "The first requisite
in the management of all the Indians in this class [the
wilder tribes] is firmness. All outrages or depredations
should be followed up promptly, and punished at all hazards
and at any cost."33 This description applied fairly well to
31. James A .• Clifford to Commissioner, 7 3/74, C473/74. See also 1914/74.
Longwill to Smith, 7/25/74, L352/74.
32. The Daily New Mexican, 3/24/75.
Legal procedure was not necessarily futile, but it certainly did not end the
traffic. Guadalupe Maro had been tried in 1867. The jury disagreed, but the defendant
then plead guilty, was fined $1.00 and costs (about $500) and sentenced to imprison~
ment for one year. Norton to Taylor, 8/3/67, N115/67.
33. Annual RepQTt, 1874, p. 5, 14.
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Alexander G., Irvine, appointed sp€cialagent in August,
1875.
A telegram received yesterday brings word
that as Major Irvine, the Ute agent at Cimarr6n,
was making his weekly issue to his wards, one of
the Indians affected dissatisfaction with the meat
issued, and threw the piece given him into Irvine's
.face; Irvine threw the meat back to the Indian,
when both drew revolvers and fired with effect.
The Indian is not expected to live, while Irvine was
wounded in the· hand. We understand an application was made for troops by one or more citizens
of Cimarron, but declined -by Gen. Granger. 34
But General Granger did send troops. Thirty cavalrymen arrived from Fort Union under Lieut. Geo. A. Cornish,
and the military took over control of the agency for the
winter. Meanwhile, due to the need of an able man at the
Navaho agency, Irvine had been transferred. Before leaving he recommended that the Jicarillas be disarmed, dismounted, and removed to Fort Stanton while the soldiers
were on the scene. This idea found favor with the secretary
of the intedor, but was not carried out due to lack of funds.
General Pope was authorized to effect the removal whenever the office of Indian affairs made the necessary prepara·
tions and provided the funds,35 but the civil officials were
not prepared for any such task at the moment; .
Perhaps there was justification for the action of the
Indian. He may have been under the influence of liquor,
the white man's brew. And the chances are good that the
meat was belo~ par. At least Sergeant James Hickman
reported that the beef issued at Cimarr6n was not fit for a
dog and that the ration was only half of what, it should be.
The explanation for such a situation might be found in a
later report concerning the procedure for supplying the
34. Daily New Mexican, 11/17/75; and 11/18/75, 11/29/75. 11/30/75.
35. Irvine to Smith, 11/24/75, 11557/75. Smith to Irvine, 11/24/75, LB 128, p.
87. Pope to Drum, 12/17/75, WI3/76. Sheridan to Pope, 12/14/75, WI0/76. See
also CI579/75,
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rations which indicated that undue profits were made by
the contractor.
The beef contract in 1877 was let to Longwill at $3.75
per ,100 pounds, which was less than meat could be purchased for. But "Of course Dr. Longwill had no intention
of filling the contract in person ..." He "knew that by giving San Pablo and Jose· Largo the head chiefs a drink of
whiskey each ration day their influence could be had to quiet
the complaints of the whole tribe ..." Furthermore, "Dr.
L. .sublet his contract to O. K. Chittenden former sheriff of
this county (at a bonus of course)~ Chit knew the ropes as
well as the Dr. and commenced filling his contract with old
Bulls poor stags and shelly cows. Not more than fit for wolf
bait ..." -The bid should have been rejected, the writer said,
because it could not be filled at the price, "but the Dr belongs
to the New Mexican Ring ..." "Well this is a disgraceful
but trne picture of Indian treatment here-a disgrace to the
Indian Bureau of your department ..." And the result was
that the poorly fed Indians depredated on the outside settlements 36 until they were finally rounded up and transferred
to their respective reservations.
36. S. H. Irvin to secretary of interior, 5/21/77, 1539/77. Hickman to COmmanding officer at Fort Union, 2/16/75, W334/76.
After writing the above Irvin reported that Longwill had taken another contract
at $4.25 and sublet it at $3.75. The butcher told the writer no fit beef could be
purchased under $5.00 per 100.
. Agent Pyle stated that the report of Hickman was false in every respect. Pyle
. to Smith. 4/29/76, Pl71/76, and 5/1/76, P173/76.
Longwill had stated earlier that the Indians desired to remain at Cimarr6n
and many settlers considered them
protection against the PI8ins Indians. "so
that I do not feel competent to advise in regard to their removal." Longwill to
Smith, in C. I. A., Annual Rep&rt, 1874, p. 305.
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CHAPTER VIn
THE NORTHERN ROUNDUP

ilE BRUNO agreement with the Ute and the Dolan agreeT ment
with the Jicarillas definitely foreshadowed the
end of the free-roaming bands of Indians in northern New
Mexico. Moreover, the mounting tide of discontent among
the settlers and the increasing depravity of the Indians were
powerful stimuli for the early consummation of those
agreements. Consequently, the old agencies at Cimarr6n
and Abiquiu were soon to become matters of history. A certain amount of fumbling was yet to occur, it is true, particularly in regard .to the· Jicarillas, but the final outcome
was clear.
Military control at Cimarr6n was not compatible with
the formal duties of the' army, and it was not satisfactory
to some of the territorial citizens. Furthermore, on the
advice of the war department, the Indians were not to be
moved before spring. Therefore, the reinstatement. of
civilian control was soon brought about. John E. Pyle, another protege of the Presbyterian board, was appointed
agent in November, 1875, despite the recommendation of
the sheriff of Colfax county and others that a local resident
be appointed. The new incumbent took charge the following January. In face of the uncertainty surrounding the
future· of the agency, he recommended in April that his
charges be kept there and that an effort be made to educate
them by employing a teacher at a salary of $500. This proposal, of course, was out of tune with the times. The Indians
were to be removed; the exact time and place was merely
a bit uncertain. 1
Inspector McNulta made the specific recommendation
in September, 1875, that the Cimarr6n agency be abolished.
This proposal found favor with the commissioner in WashL Smith to Secretary. 11/13/75. RB 27, p. 113. 490. Pyle to Smith. 8/4/76.
in C. 1. A., Annual Report. 1876. p. 104-05. O. K. Chittenden to Smith. n. d.•
C1473/75. Wm. O. Cunningham to Smith, n. d .• C1575/75. Pyle to Smith, 4/29/76.
P170/76. Pyle to Lowrie, 6/16/76. L219/76.
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ingion, but since the aid of soldiers was consiq.ered necessary and they were not available during the fall, action was
postponed. In the spring the project was again pressed.
The commissioner then proposed to move the Cimarron Ute
to Colorado and the Jicarillas to Abiquiu temporarily until
funds were sufficient to place them on the Dolan reservation. 2
At the same time when McNulta suggested closing the
Cimarron agency, a proposal was advanced to move the
Jicarillas southward to the Mescalero reservation. -This idea
met approval in some quarters and opposition in others.
The Dolan reservation included land attractive to settlers
and lay across the route to the mining region. The Indians .
had not heen actually located there; which was presumed to
indicate a lack of desire on their part to occupy the reservation. Therefore, why not restore the area to the public domain? At least SO reasoned the territorial officials as they
forwarded a memorial to the president to that effect. 3
Russell, the agent-at Abiquiu, maintained that the Jicarillas wanted to be located on their own reservation, and
~. above all "they promptly and persistently objected to going"
to Fort Stanton. If the government did not carry out the
Dolan agreement whereby the Jicarillas promised to move
to the San Juan country, what assurance did they have of
just treatment by promising to move southward?
"It appears to me," the agent wrote, "that a
fair and candid presentation of this case, is this.The Government professes to want these people to
become self-supporting, and to adopt the habits of
civilization. These Jicarilla Apaches express a
desire to do so. Will the Government give them
the opportunity?" 4
Apparently the government would give them the opportunity, but not near Abiquiu; the agent lost his fight, at
2. MeNulta to Smith, 9/9/75, M775/75. Smith to secretary of interior, 2/29/76,
RB 27, p_ 476. See also WI691/75.
3. Crothers to Smith, 9/14/75, CI214/75. Memorial to president, 3/6/76,
E81/76. Russell to commissioner, 1/25/76, R50/76.
4. Russell to commissioner, 2/6/76, R60/76, and 5/24/76, R169/76.
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least' temporarily. The commissioner recommended that
the reservation be restored to the public domain on the
grounds that congress had not ratified the agreement, that
the Indians were averse to removal there, and that the
settlers desired the land. This was carried out by Executive Order, July 18, 1876. 5
Next, the Cimarron agency was formally abolished,
September 30, 1876, due to the failure of congress to appropriate money for the salary of the agent. Responsibility for
the Indians there was transferred to the Pueblo Indian
agent, Ben M. Thomas, 6 who place<;l M. Pyle as farmer in
direct charge until, the Indians were transferred elsewhere.
Thomas had no faith 1P. the use of the military to effect
the removal. The soldiers could no more round them up,
he thought, than they could round up a flock of wild turkey.
He recommended, therefore, that the agency he closed, a
force of soldiers stationed to protect the settlers, and the
Indians told to select one of the other agencies for their
headquarters or be treated as hostiles. .This should be done
in the summer of 1878 when the silpplies on hand at
Cimarron were exhausted. 7 Inspector Vandever concurred
in this view, and the' commissioner passed it along to the
secretary of the interior, recommending that no more
rations be issued after March 1, and that the war, department should be asked to cooperate. 8
The military were 'willing to help, but not on the basis
suggested by the Indian office. Commissioner Hayt wanted
them to finance the removal and seek reimbursement from
his office upon presentation of proper vouchers for expenses.
General Sherman advised against this procedure because
he feared that the war department would never be repaid.
All he was willing to do was to provide a military escort
enroute to the reservations. But this was a minor point and
5; Smith to secretary of interior, 7/15/76, RB 28, p. 272. Kappler, I, 874-75.
C. 1. A., An'nual Report, 1876, p. 23.
6. Smith to Pyle, 8/22/76, LB 135, p. 13. Galpin to secretary of interior,
9/18/76, RB 28, p. 348.
7. Thomas to commissioner, 12/20/77, Tl/78.
8. Hayt to secretary of interior, 1/14/78, RB SO, p. 28; see also p. 286.
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plans were perfected for the final move. Instructions were
sent to Thomas, Russell, and to Francis H. Weaver at the
Southern Ute agency. April 10 was fixed as the last day for
issuing rations at the old agencies. The Indians were to be
taken care of for seven days by their old agent after arrival
on the reservation, and contractors were to be notified not
to fulfill their contracts for more than the amount needed
for that limited period. With the stage all set, the removal
was not affected. General Pope could not spare the- necessary troops because of difficulties in Colorado with the Ute. 9
Ignacio, a leader of the Capote andWiminuche in
southern Colorado, was becoming a source of trouble in
the winter, so the settlers in the region called for protection.
The 9th Cavalry was detailed, for this duty in March and
General Pope refused to bring additional troops from the
Indian Territory for the removal p'roject. When the Ignacio
affair blew over in May, the war-department was reluctant
to aid in the removal because of lack of funds, and Sherman
was objecting now to the us,e of force until he could consult
with his subordinates. lO However, something had been
accomplished; the remainder of the Capote and Wiminuche
Ute hanging around Abiquiu reluctantly' departed to the
reservation agency after they became convinced that no
more rations would be issued at the old stand,u
It was another matter with the Ute at Cimarr6n. They
were still determined to cling to their old home. In this
hour Thomas shared the reluctance of the military to, use
force, but he thought that with .the aid of $1,000 he could
break the Indian's resistance by. persuasion. If this plan
was not acceptable to the Washington office, he recommended either that they be let alone or that the agency be
9. Instructions to agents, LB 142, p. 16, 25, 55; 57. Hayt to secretary, 8/18/78,
RB 80, p. 286. A. Bell to commissioner, 3/26/78, 1454/78. Sherman to secretary of
war, 3/27/78, W511/78. iLeeds to Russell and Thomas, 3/28/78, LB 158, p. 6, 9.
,Hayt to Thomas, 4/4/78, LB 153, p. 79. Sherman to Sheridan, 4/8/78', W603/78:
see also' W657/78.
'
10. See W560/78, 1395/78, TI60/71, W765/78, T192/78, T225/78, WS'45!7S,
W5/79, W836/78.
'11. Russell to commissioner, 5/14/78, R316/78; and 6/5/78, R897/78.
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, closed and the military allowed to do the best they could in
removing them, a task which might necessitate a detailed
man-hunt. 12 But the policy of persuasion was already in the
mind of the commissioner, and it was finally followed.
Congress appropriated the sum of $5,000 for the cost of
removing the Indians, with the proviso that no more rations
should be issued at Cimarron after thirty days. The dead.:.
line was July 20, 1878; on the 18th the removal started.
A number of the Ute were selected as policemen and paid
a small sum for their services; the group as a whole was
promised $500. on arrival at the reservation agency. Part
of them moved under the charge of Thomas by way of the
Chama valley, the rest moved northward through the San
Luis valley.
Spec. Agent James H. Roberts took charge of the Jicarillas at Cimarron and started for Fort Stanton,13
The location of the Southern Ute agency south of the
San Juan mountains in 1877 and the assumption that the
Ute were officially located on their reservation had
prompted the commissioner of Indian affairs to accept the
view that "no further obstructions exist to the carrying
out of the provisions of" the Brunot agreement. 14 Consequently, the first rations were issued at the new agency on
March 1, 1878. However, it was not until summer that all
the members of the three bands that roamed partly in New
Mexico, the Capote, Wiminu'che, and Moache, were actually
on the reservation. But at least the long sought goal of. a
reservation had been reached; whether for better or worse
only time could tell. Certainly the Ute had not reached
Paradise:
.
Beyond the excessive and violent demand for
rations and the threat of taking the life of the agent
for establishing the agency on the Rio Pinos in12.
13.
LB 142,
7/31/78,
14.
Doc. 21,

Thomas to commissioner, 6/24/78, T267/78.
Leeds to Thomas, 6/19/78, LB 142, p. 375. Leeds to Watkins, 6/25/78,
p. 416. E. C. Watkins to commissioner, 7/18/78, W89/79. Thomas to Hayt,
T364/78. A. A. G. to Pope, 7/17/78, W1265/78.
C. W. Holcomh to secretary of interior, 1/9/78, 45 Congo 2 sess. Sen. Ex.
(1780).
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stead of the Rio Navajo, as they claim to have been
promised it there, there is but very little in their
cOI).duct to be condemned. I blush to say aught
about this when I reflect upon how they have been
treated by the government and imposed upon by
individuals. The almost incessant alarm of war
since I have been here has but little if any foundation, as the investigation by Lieutenant Valois, in
which I accompanied him, proved. But I 'am grateful, however, for the presence of the military in
this vicinity, because it averted, I have reason to
believe, a war. I would be loath to arraign an entire community or settlement upon the charge that
it would bring about a war, but I do not hesitate to
say that there are not a few communities on this
Western frontier who have the honor of being
graced with individuals possessed of these admirable qualities which are capable 6f imposing upon
poor Indians to such an extent as to make a military post a necessity. No class of individuals are
more liberal in circulating their hard-earned
. money than the rank and file of our Army. They
are fond of butter and eggs and vegetables. Their
horses also like the grain. It is preferable to be
at war than to be without money.15
Roberts had not had the same luck with his charges as
Thomas. Only a small band of 32 Jicarillas under San
Pablo arrived at Fort Stanton, the rest straggled over to
Abiquiu. The southern group had' arrived at their proposed
home at an inopportune time because the Lincoln County
war was under way. Consequently, they did not move onto
the reservation immediately but remained near the fort
for protection. Despite this precaution they lost a string
of horses. Furthermore, "the unsympathetic reception accorded by Agent Godfroy, and the failure of the government
to redeem its pro:qlises, filled them with discontentY; They
-15. F. H. Weaver to commissioner, 8/18/78, 45 Congo 3 sess. Hsc. Ex. Doc. 1,
IX, 512 (1850).
16. Lieut. Col. N. A. M. Dudley to A. A. A. G., 1/23/79, W393/79. Godfroy to
Hayt, 8/27/78, I1772/78; and 10/1/78. G456/78; 11/14/78, G520/78.
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finally deserted from their new home in February, 1879,
and returned northward to the Cimarron country.17
The law forbade the issuance of further rations at
Cimarron, but. Abiquiu was still an open port for government supplies. The final disposition of the Jicarillas lay in
one of three ways: turn them over to the military at Fort
Union for subsistence, feed them all at Abiquiu and ultimately locate them on a reservation in that region, or send
them to the Indian Territory. Thomas favored the last
named proposal, but the Jicarillas were more partial to
their old haunts.. The resort to the military for aid was
the least attractive to the Indian office. The removal of the
San Pablo band to Abiquiu was finally decided upon and
after some uncertainty on the part of the Indians they
finally departed in October to join their brethren. 18
In order to make the final decision about the location
of the Jicarillas, the commissioner instructed Thomas to
bring five chiefs and an interpreter to Washington in the
spring of 1879. As a result of this conference, the government decided to locate them in the Abiquiu country.. Special
Agent E. B. Townsend and Thomas' were instructed to select
'a site, taking into consideration the adaptability of the land
for allotment in severalty to the Indians, quality of soil,
timber and water supply, and sufficient area to allot 320
acres per head of a family and 160 acres to each other person; private land grants, improved lands, or mineral lands
were to be avoided. 19
These instructions were promptly carried out. The
area selected was a rectangle extending sixteen miles west
from the western boundary of the Tierra Amarilla land
grant as surveyed by Sawyer and McBroom in July, 1876,
and thirty miles southward from the Colorado line. It em17. Godfroy to Dudley, 216/79, W603/79.
IS'. See W1614/78, T301/79, T488/78, T703/79, T710/79, T724/79. W2332/79.
RB 35, p. 368. LB 144, p. 180, 422; LB 148, p. 282; LB 154, p. 28, 46.
19. E. J. Brooks to Townsend, 6/23/80, LB 158, p. 176. R. E. Trowbridge to
secretary of interior, 4/10/80, RB 36, p. 462. Hayt to Thomas. 12/6/79. LB 151.
p. 320. See also T873/79 and T407/80.
\
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braced 480 square miles of land for a population of about
750 Indians; 1,500 acres of rich bottom land lay along the
Navajo river; and there was plenty of water, good grazing,
timber, hunting and fishing. There was also a number of
"squatters" on the land. 20
The final step was to remove the Indians and the
agency to the new location. Thomas relieved Russell at the
Abiquiu agency (located at Tierra Amarilla since 1872), on
August 21, 1878, and the following December it was officially combined with the Pueblo agency.21 The last rations
were issued at Tierra Amarilla in December 1881, and the
agency headquarters were moved onto the reser'vation,
occupying some buildings at Amargo that had been abandoned by the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad. 22
There was some last minute opposition in the interest
of the squatters and the railroad, but Thomas stoutly protested in. behalf of his charges against any further change,
so the JicariIIas had finally found a fixed home and were
willing to turn their hands to the task, of becoming a farming people ,under the guidance of Frank W. Reed, farmer in '
charge. If they became a bit restive at times, there were
troops to shoo them back to the reservation when they ventured off it. 23
(To be concluded)
20. Kappler, I. 875. Townsend to Trowbridge. 8/13/80, Office of Indian Affairs,
Special Case 28. Donaldson, Public Domain, p. 246.
21. Leeds to Thomas, 12/27/78. LB 144, p. 497. Russell to commissioner. 8/21/78.
R599/78; also T477/78.
Tbis move was formally approved 'by the secretary, of, interior in December
1878, 12450/78.
Russell had been a good agent. Offering his resignation before the consolidation took place, he wrote: "I avail myself of this opportunity to sa; that while I
have not at any time claimed to have sought or accepted an, Indian agency from
motives of philanthropy, I did wish and believe that 1 could be instrumental in doing
them good." He had been disappointed because the agency location and environment'
did not fit in with his preconceptions. Russell to Commissioner. 8/7/78. 45 Congo 3
sesS. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, IX, 602 (1850).
22. Price to Thomas, 10/13/81, LB 182. p. 76. Thomas. Rep<>rt, 9/1/82, 47
Congo 2 Bess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1. IX. 190-91 (2098).
, 23. Reed to Wm. H. H. Llewellyn, 8/12/82, 47 Congo 2 BeSB. Hse. Ex. Doe. 1. II,
186-87 (2100). W. G. Ritch to S. J. Kirkwood. 7/29/81, and Thomas to Price, 8/1/81.
Office of Indian Affairs, Letter Number 18159/81 (the new. filing system in the
archive of the office of Indian affairs).

